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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Alfred Mark Fairbanks appeals from the judgment of the district court
entered upon a jury verdict finding him guilty of four counts of provider fraud.
The jury found Fairbanks, a dentist, had fraudulently billed Idaho Medicaid for
procedures he did not perform. On appeal, Fairbanks argues the jury did not
have sufficient evidence to find him guilty and the district court abused its
discretion when it denied his motion for a new trial.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Fairbanks is a dentist with a practice in Pullman, Washington. (R., p. 28.)
In August of 2010, the mother of one of Fairbanks’ former patients, and an Idaho
Medicaid recipient, complained to the Office of the Attorney General’s Medicaid
Fraud Control Unit regarding Fairbanks. (R., p. 30.) The mother complained
that her son could not receive a filling from another dentist because Fairbanks
had billed Medicaid for 13 fillings on her son’s teeth, even though Fairbanks had
only put sealants on her son’s teeth. (Id.)
Investigators interviewed Dr. Sept, a dentist practicing in Moscow, Idaho,
and Dr. Sept reported that “ninety percent of the clients she sees that have
previously been to Dr. Fairbanks have had dental work billed to Medicaid that
was not done.” (Id.) In addition, Fairbanks had, in 2008, stipulated with the
State of Washington, Department of Health, that he had billed the Washington
Department of Social and Health Services for dental work that was not
performed. (R., pp. 29-30.)

1

The investigators executed a search warrant and obtained numerous
client files from Fairbanks’ office.

(R., p. 30.)

The investigators obtained

additional client files through administrative subpoenas. (Id.) The Office of the
Attorney General retained a dentist, Dr. Coppess, to examine 43 clients for
whom Fairbanks had previously submitted claims to the Idaho Medicaid
program. (R., p. 31.) Dr. Coppess conducted in person dental examinations of
the clients and conducted subsequent chart reviews.

(Id.)

Dr. Coppess’

examinations included digital face photographs, oral examinations and digital
radiographs (x-rays). (Id.)
Dr. Coppess reported numerous discrepancies between the procedures
that Fairbanks claimed he completed and those he billed to Idaho Medicaid. (Id.)
Dr. Coppess noted over 183 such discrepancies. (Id.) “Of the 43 patients that
Dr. Coppess physically examined, he documented instances of procedures billed
to the Idaho Medicaid Program but not performed on 34 of the patients or 79% of
them.” (Id.)
The state charged Fairbanks with felony provider fraud, felony computer
crime, and felony grand theft. (R., pp. 38-46.) The charges encompassed 19
instances, between January 2007 and May 2010, where Fairbanks billed
Medicaid for dental services that he did not provide. (Id.) At the preliminary
hearing, the state moved to amend the complaint to change the dates of the
offenses to “match the exhibits and listing any claim numbers that were missing
from the criminal complaint.” (R., pp. 84-85.) The court allowed the amendment.
(R., pp. 84-85, 91-100.) At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing Fairbanks
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argued that some of the claims were barred by the statute of limitations and that
each act was a separate completed offense and not a continuing offense. (R.,
pp. 146-147.)

The magistrate court agreed, in part, and ultimately bound

Fairbanks over to the district court “on five counts of felony Provider Fraud under
I.C. § 56-227A, five counts of felony Computer Crime under I.C. § 18-2202(1),
and five counts of Petit Theft under I.C. §§18-2403(1) and 2407(2), all occurring
after October 11, 2008.” (R., p. 151.) The magistrate court noted that the felony
grand theft charges did not survive probable cause because “the aggregate
value of the surviving alleged fraudulent claims is less than $1,000.” (Id.)
The state filed an Information alleging Fairbanks committed five counts of
provider fraud and five counts of computer crime. 1 (R., pp. 155-162.) Fairbanks
filed a motion to dismiss in the district court.

(R., pp. 201-225.)

The state

agreed to dismiss counts five and ten. (R., p. 320.) The district court held a
hearing on the remaining counts. (R., pp. 309-310.) The district court held that
counts six through nine criminalized the same behavior as counts one through
four, and thus violated double jeopardy under the “pleading theory.” (R., pp.
320-327.) The district court dismissed counts six through nine. (Id.)
As a result, Fairbanks was left facing four counts of provider fraud. (R.,
pp. 156-158.)

Specifically, counts 1, 2 and 3 alleged that on three different

occasions Fairbanks billed Medicaid for composite fillings (a.k.a. restorations)

1

2

For reasons that are not clear in the record, the five counts of petit theft were
not included in the Information. (Compare R., p. 151 with R., pp. 155-162.)
2
“Restorations” are usually called “fillings.” (See e.g. 1/22/15 Tr. p. 610, L. 22 –
p. 611, L. 21.) Both terms were used interchangeably during trial, and both
terms will be used on appeal.
3

on Allen Stacy’s teeth numbers 20, 21, 4, 5 and 12,3 but did not provide
composite fillings in those teeth. (See R., pp. 156-157.) Count 4 alleged that
Fairbanks billed Medicaid for a composite filling on Joshua Gray’s tooth number
21, but did not provide a composite filling for that tooth. (R., pp. 157-158.)
The case went to jury trial. Over the course of five days the state called
21 witnesses and Fairbanks called one witness. (See Tr., Vol. 1, pp. 4-8.) Ben
Gagnon, an investigator for the Office of the Attorney General Medicaid Fraud
Unit, testified for the state that his office had received an allegation that
Fairbanks was billing Medicaid for fillings, but was instead providing a different
service or no service at all.

(1/21/15 Tr., p. 456, L. 19 – p. 457, L. 3.)

Investigator Gagnon began investigating Fairbanks in February of 2011.
(1/21/15 Tr., p. 457, Ls. 7-8.)
The state introduced evidence of claims submitted by Fairbanks to Idaho
Medicaid related to dental work he claimed he did on Allen Stacy and Joshua
Gray. (1/22/15 Tr., p. 754, L. 22 – p. 764, L. 22; Exs. 24 and 25.) Fairbanks
submitted a claim to Idaho Medicaid on January 9, 2009, claiming that, on
January 7, 2009, he performed a “resin-based composite, one surface posterior”
on Allen Stacy’s teeth numbers 20 and 21. (1/22/15 Tr., p. 760, Ls. 6-24; Ex.
24.) Fairbanks also submitted a claim on January 26, 2009, claiming that, on
January 21, 2009, he performed a “resin-based composite, one surface
posterior” on Allen Stacy’s teeth numbers 4 and 5. (1/22/15 Tr., p. 760, L. 25 –

3

The “tooth numbers” refer to a universal tooth numbering system utilized by
dentists. (See 1/23/15 Tr., p. 851, L. 20 – p . 852, L. 5.) Permanent teeth are
numbered 1 through 32. (See 1/23/15 Tr., p. 852, Ls. 6-10.)
4

p. 761, L. 14; Ex. 24.) Fairbanks also submitted a claim on February 17, 2009,
claiming that, on February 10, 2009, he performed a “resin-based composite,
one surface posterior” on Allen Stacy’s tooth number 12. (1/22/15 Tr., p. 761, L.
15 – p. 762, L. 4; Ex. 24.) Fairbanks submitted a claim to Idaho Medicaid on
May 4, 2010, claiming that, on April 30, 2010, he performed a “resin-based
composite, one surface posterior” on Joshua Gray’s tooth number 21. (1/22/15
Tr., p. 762, Ls. 5-21; Ex. 25.) These claims were all paid by Idaho Medicaid.
(1/22/15 Tr., p. 757, L. 5 – p. 760, L. 5; Exs. 24, 25.) As part of the investigation,
Investigator Gagnon hired a dentist, Dr. Coppess, to serve as an expert to
examine the seized dental records and to examine the patients. (1/21/15 Tr., p.
481, L. 24 – p. 482, L. 13.)
Dr. Coppess, a licensed dentist with over 35 years of experience, testified.
(1/23/15 Tr., p. 839, L. 7 – p. 851, L. 19.) Dr. Coppess explained how a dentist
puts a composite resin restoration (a.k.a. filling) into a patient’s tooth. When a
tooth is prepared for a filling the dentist uses a high speed drill to drill a hole into
the patient’s tooth. (1/23/15 Tr., p. 869, L. 4 – p. 870, L. 17, p. 871, L. 14 – p.
873, L. 14; Ex. 22.) After the hole is complete, an etching material is applied to
help with bonding, then the tooth is flushed out and filled with a bonding resin.
(1/23/15 Tr., p. 874, L. 6 – p. 876, L. 16.) The patient’s mouth is filled with cotton
or a rubber dam to prevent the patient’s saliva from affecting the bonding.
(1/23/15 Tr., p. 875, Ls. 11-24.) The bonding resin is cured for approximately 30
seconds and then the composite material is placed in the excavated hole in the
tooth. (1/23/15 Tr., p. 876, L. 17 – p. 878, L. 20.) The composite resin is then

5

shaped to make sure the patient still has a proper bite and polished to make it
smoother and more stain resistant. (1/23/15 Tr., p. 878, L. 21 – p. 880, L. 11.) A
composite restoration lasts approximately six or seven years. (1/23/15 Tr., p.
881, Ls. 19-23.) Even if a composite restoration completely fell out of a tooth,
the hole drilled in the tooth would still be visible. (1/23/15 Tr., p. 882, Ls. 12-20;
Ex. 22.) Manufacturers add a chemical to the composite resin that makes fillings
show up on x-rays. (1/23/15 Tr., p. 888, Ls. 18-24.)
Dr. Coppess also explained the difference between a filling and a sealant.
A sealant is a protective measure applied to the surface of the tooth to provide
“an extra barrier to keep the bacteria from tunneling into the dentin and causing
decay.” (1/23/15 Tr., p. 886, L. 22 – p. 887, L. 3.) Sealants usually do not show
up on x-rays because sealants are comprised of a very thin layer of composite
resin. (1/23/15 Tr., p. 887, L. 17 – p. 888, L. 17.)
Dr. Coppess examined Joshua Gray on August 23, 2011, at the Lewis
and Clark State College Dental Hygiene Department. (1/23/15 Tr., p. 889, Ls.
19-25.) This dental examination included x-rays of his teeth. (1/21/15 Tr., p.
483, L. 16 – p. 484, L. 11.) Vonda Mulrony, a dental hygienist for 28 years and a
teacher, testified that she assisted Dr. Coppess in taking x-rays in August 2011
using the Lewis and Clark State College x-ray equipment. (1/21/15 Tr., p. 522,
Ls. 11-21, p. 527, L. 16 – p. 528, L. 12.) Ms. Mulrony testified that the x-ray
equipment was only three years old in August 2011. (1/21/15 Tr., p. 526, Ls. 46.) After it was installed, the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare inspected
the x-ray equipment to ensure it was projecting a proper image. (1/21/15 Tr., p.
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526, Ls. 7-20.) The x-ray equipment passed the tests performed by the Idaho
Department of Health and Welfare. (Id.) The x-ray equipment is also subject to
an annual recertification inspection. (1/21/15 Tr., p. 526, L. 21 – p. 527, L. 11.)
The x-ray equipment was inspected each year from 2008 to 2011 and the x-ray
equipment was working properly. (Id.) Ms. Mulrony testified that Lewis and
Clark State College x-ray equipment uses an indirect imaging system which is as
accurate as a digital system. (1/21/15 Tr., p. 534, Ls. 13-17.)
In addition to the x-rays, Dr. Coppess also used a piece of dental
equipment called an “explorer” during the oral examination of Joshua Gray.
(1/23/15 Tr., p. 891, L. 8 – p. 892, L. 12.) Using an explorer, Dr. Coppess can
feel whether a composite resin restoration is on a tooth. (Id.) Dr. Coppess’
examination of Joshua Gray also included a visual examination. (1/23/15 Tr., p.
891, L. 8 – p. 893, L. 1.)

Dr. Coppess was able to observe composite

restorations on teeth numbers 20, 18, 19, 27, 29, 30, 31 and 28. (1/23/15 Tr., p.
901, L. 6 – p. 902, L. 23.) Dr. Coppess did not observe a composite restoration
on Joshua Gray’s tooth number 21. (Id.) Nor did Dr. Coppess observe any sign
that Joshua Gray’s tooth number 21 was prepared (drilled) for a restoration.
(1/23/15 Tr., p. 986, Ls. 11-14.)
Dr. Coppess examined Allen Stacy on November 17, 2011, at the Palouse
Pediatric Dentistry in Moscow, Idaho.

(1/23/15 Tr., p. 913, Ls. 2-5.)

This

examination also included x-rays. (1/21/15 Tr., p. 497, L. 20 – p. 498, L. 21.)
Michelle Walker, who works at Palouse Pediatric Dentistry, testified that the x-ray
machines at Palouse Pediatric Density were installed in 2007. (1/21/15 Tr., p.
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542, L. 24 – p. 543, L. 4.) Ms. Walker, who has 46 years of experience in
dentistry, testified that she was unaware of any problems with the x-ray
machines in November of 2011. (1/21/15 Tr., p. 542, L. 18 – p. 543, L. 22.)
Dr. Coppess also used an explorer to examine Allen Stacy’s teeth.
(1/23/15 Tr., p. 913, L. 24 – p. 914, L. 9.) Dr. Coppess observed composite
restorations on some of Allen Stacy’s teeth but did not observe composite
4
restorations on Allen Stacy’s teeth numbers 4, 5, 20, 21 and 12. (1/23/15 Tr., p.

917, L. 11 – p. 923, L. 9.) Dr. Coppess also examined six x-rays of Allen Stacy’s
teeth. (1/23/15 Tr., p. 923, L. 13 – p. 925, L. 5; Ex. 9B.) Composite restorations
are visible on x-rays, but the x-rays did not show composite restorations on Allen
Stacy’s teeth 4, 5, 20, 21 and 12. (1/23/15 Tr., p. 925, L. 16 – p. 927, L. 18; Ex.
9B.) Nor did Dr. Coppess observe evidence of the preparations for composite
restorations on Allen Stacy’s teeth numbers 4, 5, 20, 21 and 12. (1/23/15 Tr., p.
985, L. 11 – p. 986, L. 10.)
After the state rested, Fairbanks moved for a judgment of acquittal under
Idaho Criminal Rule 29. (1/23/15 Tr., p. 1016, L. 3 – p. 1021, L. 20.) The district
court denied the motion. (1/23/15 Tr., p. 1021, L. 21 – p. 1022, L. 6.) Fairbanks
called a dentist, Dr. Staley, to testify. (1/26/15 Tr., p. 1035, L. 9 – p. 1132, L.
24.)

Dr. Staley testified that, based on the x-rays, he thought there was a

restoration on Allen Stacy’s tooth number 20, but Dr. Staley could not tell

4

Dr. Coppess initially testified that he observed a restoration on tooth number
20, but then clarified that there could have been a sealant. (1/23/15 Tr., p. 917,
L. 17 – p. 918, L. 10, p. 928, L. 19 – p. 930, L. 6; Ex. 9B.) Dr. Coppess’ ultimate
conclusion was there was not a restoration on tooth number 20. (Id.)
8

whether there was a restoration on tooth number 21. (1/26/15 Tr., p. 1087, L. 21
– p. 1088, L. 6.) Dr. Staley testified it was difficult for him to determine whether
there was a restoration on Allen Stacy’s teeth numbers 4, 5 and 12. (1/26/15 Tr.,
p. 1093, L. 9 – p. 1095, L. 2.) Dr. Staley also testified it was not clear, based
upon the x-ray, whether Joshua Gray had a restoration or not on tooth number
21. (1/26/15 Tr., p. 1096, L. 5 – p. 1102, L. 16.) However, Dr. Staley testified
that it was important to visually see patients when treating them. (1/23/15 Tr.,
pp. 1112, Ls. 6-9.)

In addition, Dr. Staley admitted that he did not visually

examine or tactilely examine Allen Stacy or Joshua Gray. (1/23/15 Tr., p. 1112,
L. 6 – p. 1113, L. 7.)
The jury found Fairbanks guilty of four counts of provider fraud. (1/28/15
Tr., p. 1268, Ls. 6-19; R., pp. 467-468.) Fairbanks filed a motion for a new trial.
(R., pp. 477-510.) Fairbanks argued he was entitled to a new trial because, after
the jury found him guilty, Fairbanks gave a dental exam to Allen Stacy. (R., p.
628.) Fairbanks alleged that his dental exam and new, better x-rays revealed
that he had in fact done the dental work for which he had billed Medicaid. (Id.)
At the hearing, the district court heard testimony from Allen Stacy. (3/5/15 Tr., p.
1282, L. 22 – p. 1313, L. 16.) Allen Stacy is on Medicaid because he is mentally
disabled. (3/5/15 Tr., p. 1285, L. 25 – p. 1286, L. 20.) Allen Stacy testified that
he sometimes has difficulty remembering events, but sometimes he has a
“decent memory.” (3/5/15 Tr., p. 1292, Ls. 15-23.) Allen Stacy testified that
Fairbanks paid him $300 in cash to come in and be examined. (3/5/15 Tr., p.
1299, Ls. 7-24.)
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Allen Stacy testified that he has lived at the same address for eight or nine
years and he was still living there between November 26, 2013 and January 20,
2015. (3/5/15 Tr., p. 1302, L. 24 – p. 1303, L. 10.) Donald Davis, a process
server, also testified that he did not have any difficultly locating Allen Stacy at his
address in Bovill, Idaho.

(3/5/15 Tr., p. 1325, Ls. 7-22.)

Mr. Davis was

successful in serving Allen Stacy on the same day he got directions to do so
from Fairbanks’ defense counsel. (3/5/15 Tr., p. 1331, Ls. 11-15.)
Robyn Fyffe, one of Fairbanks’ attorneys, testified that, before trial she
tried to call Allen Stacy using the phone number listed on the investigative report
and when she discovered the number was disconnected she did “a little poking
around on the Internet.” (3/5/15 Tr., p. 1342, L. 8 – p. 1343, L. 10.) Ms. Fyffe
admitted that they did not try to send a letter or anyone to Allen Stacy’s address
prior to trial. (3/5/15 Tr., p. 1347, Ls. 3-21.)
Fairbanks testified that after trial he was able to contact Allen Stacy
through a third party. (3/5/15 Tr., p. 1376, L. 6 – p. 1377, L. 17.) Fairbanks
testified that he examined Allen Stacy’s teeth on February 6, 2015, and Mr.
Stacy’s teeth numbers 20, 21, 4, 5, and 12 all had visible restorations. (3/5/15
Tr., p. 1392, Ls. 12-23.)

Fairbanks admitted that he paid Mr. Stacy $300.

(3/5/15 Tr., p. 1380, Ls. 18-20.)

Fairbanks also admitted that in 2008 he

stipulated to findings of fact in the State of Washington that he had billed for
restorations when he had not in fact done restorations. (3/5/15 Tr. p. 1416, Ls.
2-8.)
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The district court denied Fairbanks’ Motion for New Trial. (R., pp. 627650.) The district court first noted that Fairbanks’ Motion for a New Trial only
pertained to Counts 1, 2 and 3 – the counts involving Allen Stacy. (R., p. 632.)
Fairbanks provided no evidence regarding Count 4 – the count involving Joshua
Gray. (Id.)
The district court held that Fairbanks was not entitled to a new trial
because Fairbanks failed to meet any of the four requirements of the Drapeau
test.5 (R., p. 633.) First, the district court determined that the “evidence is not
newly discovered because it was available to the defendant and diligence was
not exercised.” (R., p. 633 (citing State v. Ames, 112 Idaho 144, 147, 730 P.2d
1064, 1067 (Ct. App. 1986)).) The district court found that Fairbanks was in
possession of Allen Stacy’s address throughout the proceedings and his failure
to contact Allen Stacy “has every indication of being a strategic decision of
Fairbanks’s attorneys.” (R., pp. 633-636.)
Second, the district court held that Fairbanks failed to meet his burden of
demonstrating that the evidence was material.

(R., pp. 636-642.)

On this

requirement, the district court found, among other things, that Fairbanks’
testimony “lack[ed] any indicia of reliability” and “[Allen] Stacy’s testimony was
highly suspicious – to the point of lacking credibility.” (R., pp. 637-640.) Further,
the district court found that “[a]t the very least, [Allen] Stacy had some dental
work following his examination by Dr. Coppess and before being examined by

5

See State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685, 551 P.2d 972 (1976).
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Fairbanks.” (R., pp. 639-640.) The evidence was not material “because it only
adds to the battle of the experts that characterized this case.” (R., p. 633.)
Third, the district court found that Fairbanks’ new evidence was unlikely to
produce an acquittal. (R., pp. 642-643.) The district court found that if the new
x-ray evidence had been used, then the state would have been allowed to
explain why Dr. Coppess did not obtain similar x-rays. (Id.) Dr. Coppess did not
obtain similar x-rays because of the large number of patients Dr. Coppess
examined related to Fairbanks’ fraud. (Id.) Therefore, if the new x-rays were
admitted, then the state would have been able to introduce evidence of the scale
of Fairbanks’ fraud. (Id.)
Finally, the district court held that Fairbanks’ counsel was not diligent. (R.,
pp. 644-648.)

The district court held that the “meager efforts” of Fairbanks’

counsel to contact Allen Stacy did not constitute due diligence. (Id.) The district
court found that Fairbanks and his counsel had Allen Stacy’s correct address for
the entirety of the proceedings and Fairbanks was able to contact Allen Stacy
within days after the verdict. (Id.) The district court concluded that Fairbanks
failed to show any of the four elements required by the Drapeau test and denied
Fairbanks’ motion for a new trial. (R., p. 648.)
The district court sentenced Fairbanks to five years with one year fixed,
and placed Fairbanks on probation.

(R., pp. 690-702.)

Fairbanks timely

appealed. (R., pp. 709-714.) Based upon a stipulation of the parties, the district
court suspended the sentence pending appeal. (R., pp. 719-724.)

12

ISSUES
Fairbanks states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Was there sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that Mr. Fairbanks committed Provider Fraud?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by denying Mr.
Fairbanks’ Motion For A New Trial?

(Appellant’s brief, p. 9.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Has Fairbanks failed to show the evidence was insufficient to
support the jury’s verdict finding him guilty of four counts of provider fraud?
2.
Has Fairbanks failed to show the district court abused its discretion
when it denied his motion for a new trial on three counts of provider fraud?

13

ARGUMENT
I.
The State Presented Sufficient Evidence From Which The Jury Could Conclude,
Beyond A Reasonable Doubt, That Fairbanks Committed Four Counts Of
Provider Fraud
A.

Introduction
Fairbanks argues on appeal that “the evidence was insufficient to prove

beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Fairbanks did not perform the dental work
he billed to Medicaid.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 10.) On appeal, Fairbanks asks this
Appellate Court to find Dr. Coppess’ testimony was not credible because
Fairbanks claims Dr. Coppess relied upon low quality x-rays. (See Appellant’s
brief, pp. 13-14.)
This Court should reject Fairbanks’ invitation to reweigh the testimony of
Dr. Coppess.

Dr. Coppess testified that he personally examined both Allen

Stacy and Joshua Gray and found based upon his visual inspection, his tactile
inspection, and x-rays that no composite restorations or preparation for fillings
were done on Allen Stacy’s teeth numbers 4, 5, 20, 21 and 12 or Joshua Gray’s
tooth 21. Fairbanks’ argument is without merit and the jury based its verdict
upon substantial evidence.
B.

Standard Of Review
“Appellate review of the sufficiency of evidence is limited in scope.” State

v. Marsh, 153 Idaho 360, 365, 283 P.3d 107, 112 (Ct. App. 2011). An appellate
court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered upon a jury verdict if
there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could have found
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the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Miller,
131 Idaho 288, 292, 955 P.2d 603, 607 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. Reyes, 121
Idaho 570, 826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992). In conducting this review the appellate
court will not substitute its view for that of the jury as to the credibility of
witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, or the reasonable inferences
to be drawn from the evidence. Miller, 131 Idaho at 292, 955 P.2d at 607; State
v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 822 P.2d 998 (Ct. App. 1991). Moreover, the facts,
and inferences to be drawn from those facts, are construed in favor of upholding
the jury’s verdict. Miller, 131 Idaho at 292, 955 P.2d at 607; State v. Hart, 112
Idaho 759, 761, 735 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Ct. App. 1987).
C.

The Jury Had Substantial Competent Evidence That Fairbanks Did Not
Provide Composite Restorations On Allen Stacy’s Teeth Numbers 4, 5,
20, 21 And 12 Or Joshua Gray’s Tooth Number 21
There was substantial evidence that Fairbanks did not provide composite

restoration to Allen Stacy’s teeth numbers 4, 5, 20, 21 and 12 or Joshua Gray’s
tooth number 21. The only dentist who testified at trial who had examined
Joshua Gray or Allen Stacy was the state’s expert, Dr. Coppess. (1/23/15 Tr., p.
839, L. 7 – p. 851, L. 19, p. 889, Ls. 19-25, p. 913, Ls. 2-5.) Dr. Coppess
personally examined Joshua Gray on August 23, 2011, and during that
examination he used an “explorer” to tactilely examine Joshua Gray’s teeth and
also took x-rays of Joshua Gray’s teeth. (1/23/15 Tr., p. 891, L. 8 – p. 897, L. 2;
Ex. 10C.)

Based upon these examinations, Dr. Coppess did not observe a

composite restoration on Joshua Gray’s tooth number 21. (1/23/15 Tr., p. 901,
L. 6 – p. 902, L. 23, p. 906, L. 14 – p. 909, L. 2; Ex. 10C.)
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Dr. Coppess examined Allen Stacy on November 17, 2011, at the Palouse
Pediatric Dentistry in Moscow, Idaho. (1/23/15 Tr., p. 913, Ls. 2-5.) Dr. Coppess
also used an explorer to examine Allen Stacy’s teeth. (1/23/15 Tr., p. 913, L. 24
– p. 914, L. 9.) Dr. Coppess observed composite restorations on some of Allen
Stacy’s teeth but did not observe a composite restoration on Allen Stacy’s teeth
numbers 4, 5, 20, 21 and 12. (1/23/15 Tr., p. 917, L. 11 – p. 923, L. 9.) Dr.
Coppess also examined six x-rays of Allen Stacy’s teeth. (1/23/15 Tr., p. 923, L.
13 – p. 925, L. 5; Ex. 9B.) The x-rays did not show composite restorations on
Allen Stacy’s teeth numbers 4, 5, 20, 21 and 12. (1/23/15 Tr., p. 925, L. 16 – p.
927, L. 18; Ex. 9B.)
Despite this evidence, Fairbanks argues on appeal that there was not
sufficient evidence that Fairbanks did not provide composite restorations to Allen
Stacy’s teeth numbers 4, 5, 20, 21 and 12 and Joshua Gray’s tooth number 21.
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 12-14.)

Fairbanks attempts to discredit Dr. Coppess’

testimony. (See id.) Fairbanks argues that Dr. Coppess was out of touch with
current dental practice and argues that the x-rays used by Dr. Coppess were of
poor quality. (See id.) Neither of these arguments point to a lack of evidence,
but are rather invitations for this Court to substitute its view for that of the jury as
to the credibility of Dr. Coppess, the weight to be given to his testimony, and the
reasonable inferences to be drawn from his testimony. Because it is not the
province of the appellate court to re-weigh evidence or re-determine credibility,
Fairbanks’ sufficiency of the evidence argument fails.
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Even if the substance of Fairbanks’ arguments is considered his
arguments fail.

On appeal, Fairbanks implicitly challenges Dr. Coppess’

expertise in dentistry. (See Appellant’s brief, p. 13.) However, Fairbanks fails to
acknowledge that Dr. Coppess is a licensed dentist in the State of Idaho, with
over 35 years of dental practice. (1/23/15 Tr., p. 839, L. 13 – p. 840, L. 5.) After
Dr. Coppess retired from his dental practice, Dr. Coppess remained current in
dentistry and established a consulting practice in forensic odontology. (1/23/15
Tr., p. 841, Ls. 12-20.) Dr. Coppess is also a member of DMORT, the Disaster
Mortuary Operational Response Team, which is a federal agency under the
Department of Health and Human Services. (1/23/15 Tr., p. 842, L. 10 – p. 845,
L. 14.)

As a member of DMORT, Dr. Coppess is called in to assist local

coroners and medical examiners in mass fatality incidents. (Id.) For example,
Dr. Coppess was deployed to Louisiana following Hurricane Katrina to assist in
the identification of victims through the use of dental records and examinations.
(Id.)

Dr. Coppess also investigated and prepared reports for the Board of

Dentistry for the State of Idaho. (1/23/15 Tr., p. 845, L. 22 – p. 846, L. 15.) Dr.
Coppess is a well-qualified and experienced forensic dentist; Fairbanks’
argument to the contrary on appeal is without merit. Further, the weight to give
Dr. Coppess’ testimony based upon his expertise is the province of the jury, not
the appellate court.
Fairbanks also argues that the x-ray used by Dr. Coppess to help
determine there was no restoration on Joshua Gray’s tooth number 21 was of
“very poor quality.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 13 (citing 1/23/15 Tr., p. 978, L. 25 – p.

17

981, L. 7).) Fairbanks argues, “Dr. Coppess simply made the assumption that no
filling was present even though he was able to see the other restorations on the
x-ray.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 13.) This argument supports the jury’s verdict. The
fact that Dr. Coppess could see other restorations on the x-ray, but could not see
any restoration on Joshua Gray’s tooth number 21 – supports a finding that the
x-ray quality was good enough to see restorations on other teeth and supports
Dr. Coppess’ conclusion that there was no restoration on tooth number 21. (See
1/23/15 Tr., p. 976, L. 16 – p. 981, L. 7; Exs. 10A-1, D.)
There was substantial evidence that the x-rays used to help examine
Allen Stacy’s and Joshua Gray’s teeth were of a good quality. Allen Stacy was
examined on November 17, 2011, at the Palouse Pediatric Dentistry. (1/21/15
Tr., p. 495, L. 17 – p. 496, L. 1, p. 497, L. 20 – p. 498, L. 21.) Michelle Walker,
who works at Palouse Pediatric Dentistry, testified that the x-ray machines at
Palouse Pediatric Density were installed in 2007. (1/21/15 Tr., p. 542, L. 24 – p.
543, L. 4.) Ms. Walker, who has 46 years of experience in dentistry, testified that
she was unaware of any problems with x-ray machines in November of 2011.
(1/21/15 Tr., p. 542, L. 18 – p. 543, L. 22.)
Ms. Mulrony, who assisted Dr. Coppess in taking x-rays at the Lewis and
Clark State College, where Joshua Gray was examined, testified that the x-ray
equipment was only three years old in August 2011. (1/21/15 Tr., p. 526, Ls. 46.) The x-ray equipment was also subject to an annual recertification inspection
from the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare. (1/21/15 Tr., p. 526, L. 21 –
p. 527, L. 11.) The x-ray equipment was inspected each year from 2008 to 2011
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and the x-ray equipment was working properly. (Id.) Ms. Mulrony also testified
that this x-ray equipment uses an indirect imaging systems which is as accurate
as a digital system.

(1/21/15 Tr., p. 534, Ls. 1-17.)

Further, contrary to

Fairbanks’ contention on appeal, Dr. Coppess testified that the quality of the xrays used to help examine Joshua Gray’s teeth was “pretty decent.” (1/23/15
Tr., p. 992, L. 1 – p. 993, L. 12; Ex. 10C.)
Even if there was an issue with detecting whether a tooth had a
restoration inside of it, Dr. Coppess also testified there was no evidence that the
teeth at issue had been prepared (drilled) for a restoration. Dr. Coppess testified
he did not observe any sign that Joshua Gray’s tooth number 21 was prepared
for a restoration. (1/23/15 Tr., p. 986, Ls. 11-14.) Nor did Dr. Coppess observe
any evidence that Allen Stacy’s teeth numbers 4, 5, 20, 21 and 12 were prepared
for a restoration. (1/23/15 Tr., p. 985, L. 11 – p. 986, L. 10.)
Dr. Staley, the dentist who testified on behalf of Fairbanks, never
personally examined Allen Stacy or Joshua Gray. (1/23/15 Tr., p. 1112, L. 6 – p.
1113, L. 7.) Dr. Coppess personally examined both Allen Stacy and Joshua
Gray, and Dr. Coppess was able to both visually examine their teeth and tactilely
examine their teeth. The credibility determination between the experts was a
determination to be made by the jury and may not be re-determined on appeal.
There was substantial evidence from which a jury could conclude that Fairbanks
did not provide composite restorations to Allen Stacy’s teeth numbers 4, 5, 20,
21 and 12 or Joshua Gray’s tooth number 21.
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II.
Fairbanks Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It
Denied His Motion For A New Trial
A.

Introduction
Shortly after the jury found him guilty, Fairbanks contacted Allen Stacy

and paid him to come in for a dental examination and x-rays. (See R., p. 628;
3/5/15 Tr., p. 1299, Ls. 7-24.)

Fairbanks claimed the results of this dental

examination and x-rays entitled him to a new trial on counts 1, 2 and 3. (See R.,
pp. 627-650.) The district court found that Fairbanks failed to meet any of the
four requirements necessary under the Drapeau test and denied his motion for a
new trial. (Id.) Fairbanks challenges the district court’s ruling, but he has failed
to show the district court abused its discretion.
B.

Standard Of Review
Granting or denying a motion for a new trial is within the district court’s

discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal unless that discretion is abused.
State v. Jones, 127 Idaho 478, 481, 903 P.2d 67, 70 (1995); State v. Pugsley,
119 Idaho 62, 63, 803 P.2d 563, 564 (Ct. App. 1991).
C.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Denied Fairbanks’
Motion For A New Trial And Found Fairbanks Failed To Meet Any Of The
Four Elements Of The Drapeau Test
A defendant may obtain a new trial “[w]hen new evidence is discovered

material to the defendant, and which he could not with reasonable diligence have
discovered and produced at the trial.” I.C. § 19-2406(7). In State v. Drapeau, 97
Idaho 685, 551 P.2d 972 (1976), the Idaho Supreme Court articulated the four-
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part test a defendant must satisfy in order to be entitled to a new trial based
upon newly discovered evidence. That test requires a defendant to show that
the evidence offered in support of his motion for a new trial (1) is newly
discovered and was unknown to the defendant at the time of trial; (2) is material,
not merely cumulative or impeaching; (3) will probably produce an acquittal; and
(4) failure to learn of the evidence was due to no lack of diligence on the part of
the defendant. Id. at 691, 551 P.2d at 978.
In announcing this four-part test, the Court cited Professor Wright’s text
on Federal Practice and Procedure and specifically noted his comment, “after a
man has had his day in court, and has been fairly tried, there is a proper
reluctance to give him a second trial.” Drapeau, 97 Idaho at 691, 551 P.2d at
978 (citation omitted).

“Motions for a new trial based on newly discovered

evidence are disfavored and should be granted with caution, reflecting the
importance accorded to considerations of repose, regularity of decision making,
and conservation of scarce judicial resources.” State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139,
144, 191 P.3d 217, 222 (2008) (internal quotations and citations omitted)
(quoting State v. Hayes, 144 Idaho 574, 577, 165 P.3d 288, 291 (Ct. App.
2007)).
After the trial, Fairbanks paid Allen Stacy to come to his clinic for an
examination. (3/5/15 Tr., p. 1380, Ls. 18-20.) Fairbanks alleged the results of
this examination and x-rays constituted newly discovered evidence that entitled
him to a new trial on counts 1, 2 and 3. (R., p. 632.) Fairbanks’ motion did not
seek a new trial on count 4 – the count related to Joshua Gray. (Id.). After a
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hearing, the district court found that Fairbanks failed to show any of the four
elements of the Drapeau test. (R., pp. 627-650.) On appeal, Fairbanks has
failed to show the district court abused its discretion.
1.

Fairbanks Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its
Discretion When It Found The Evidence Was Not Newly
Discovered

“Newly discovered evidence is evidence which could not have been
discovered by the exercise of due diligence either before or at the time of trial.”
State v. Ames, 112 Idaho 144, 147, 730 P.2d 1064, 1067 (Ct. App. 1986) (citing
In re Hill, 460 So.2d 792 (Miss. 1984)). The district court found that Allen Stacy
lived at the same address for the eight last years. (R., p. 634.) Allen Stacy had
not changed addresses since Fairbanks first saw Allen Stacy back in 2009. (Id.)
The state disclosed Allen Stacy’s address in discovery. (R., p. 647.) The district
court found that Fairbanks was in possession of Allen Stacy’s address
throughout the proceedings. (R., p. 634.) The district court explained that the
process server was able to find Allen Stacy almost immediately after being given
his address:
To begin, [Allen] Stacy’s address was in Fairbanks’s possession
throughout these proceedings. (The address where [Allen] Stacy
was found, within hours of the process server being given it, has
never changed from the time [Allen] Stacy was originally seen by
Fairbanks, some eight years ago.)
(R., p. 634.)
The district court also found that Fairbanks’ failure to find Allen Stacy
before trial “has every indication of being a strategic decision of Fairbanks’s
attorneys.” (R., p. 636.) Fairbanks testified that he was advised by his attorneys
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that pursing pre-trial examinations of Allen Stacy and Joshua Gray “represented
6
significant risk.” (R., p. 635. ) The district court found that a motion for a new

trial is not appropriate if the “newly discovered” evidence was not pursued pretrial because of a strategic decision. (R., p. 635 (citing 3 Fed. Prac & Proc. Crim.
§ 584 (4th ed.) (“[a] defendant is not permitted to change his strategy after an
unfavorable verdict and use evidence he chose not to present at trial”); U.S. v.
Garcia-Alvarez, 541 F.3d 8, 16-18 (1st Cir. 2008).) The district court held that
Fairbanks did not meet his burden of showing that his “newly discovered
evidence” was evidence which Fairbanks could not have discovered by the
exercise of due diligence before trial. (R., pp. 633-636.)
On appeal, Fairbanks argues the district court’s finding that he did not
exercise due diligence in attempting to find Allen Stacy pre-trial was clearly
erroneous. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 19-20 (citing Ames, 122 at 148, 730 P.2d at
1068).)

Fairbanks argues that because Allen Stacy’s phone number was

disconnected and Fairbanks’ counsel tried to call that phone number, the court
clearly erred in finding a lack of due diligence. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 19-20.)
Fairbanks does not provide any law to support his argument that merely making
a phone call to a prospective witness is sufficient to satisfy due diligence. (See
Appellant’s brief, pp. 19-20.) Nor does Fairbanks challenge the district court’s
conclusion that his failure to contact Allen Stacy was the result of a strategic trial
decision. Fairbanks has failed to show the district court’s finding that Fairbanks

6

The district court also found that Fairbanks’ credibility was questionable, in part,
because he gave contradictory testimony regarding whether he wanted pre-trial
dental examinations of Joshua Gray and Allen Stacy. (R., pp. 635-636.)
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failed to exercise due diligence was clearly erroneous and thus has failed to
show the district court abused its discretion when it found that his post-trial
dental examination and x-rays of Allen Stacy constituted newly discovered
evidence.
2.

Fairbanks Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its
Discretion When It Found The Evidence Was Not Material

The next prong of the Drapeau standard requires a defendant seeking a
new trial on the grounds of newly discovered evidence to show that the proposed
evidence is material to his guilt or innocence, and is not merely impeaching.
Drapeau, 97 Idaho at 691, 551 P.2d at 978. Evidence may be both material and
impeaching. State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 74, 253 P.3d 727, 748 (2011). The
Idaho Court of Appeals has described the difference between impeachment
evidence and substantive evidence as follows:
Unlike substantive evidence which is offered for the purpose of
persuading the trier of fact as to the truth of a proposition on which
the determination of the tribunal is to be asked, impeachment is
that which is designed to discredit a witness, i.e. to reduce the
effectiveness of his testimony by bringing forth the evidence which
explains why the jury should not put faith in him or his testimony.
State v. Marsh, 141 Idaho 862, 868-69, 119 P.3d 637, 643-44 (Ct. App. 2004).
Contrary to Fairbanks’ assertions on appeal, the district court correctly held that
Fairbanks failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that the evidence was
material. (R., pp. 636-642.)
The district court articulated three reasons why this evidence was not
material. (Id.) First, the district court found that this evidence was obtained by
Fairbanks himself. (R., pp. 637-638.) While the district court did not entirely
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discount Fairbanks’ testimony, the district court found that Fairbanks’ credibility
was undermined by the “extensive interest” he has in his own case and by the
testimony of Dr. Sept, who offered testimony outside the presence of the jury.

7

(R., pp. 637-638.) The district court found that the “new” evidence obtained by
Fairbanks, “lacks any indicia of reliability.” (R., p. 637.)
Second, the district court found the evidence was not material because it
did not address whether Fairbanks did the dental work in 2009. (R., pp. 638640.)
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that Fairbanks’s
evidence shows everything he claims (that there are fillings in
Stacy’s teeth) – it does not answer the question of whether
Fairbanks provided the dental services when billed for them in
2009.
(R., p. 639.) Allen Stacy testified at the motion for new trial hearing. (R., pp.
639-640.)

The district court found Allen Stacy’s testimony to be “highly

suspicious – to the point of lacking credibility.” (R., pp. 637-640.) The district
court even inquired whether Allen Stacy was under the influence of drugs
“because that is how he appeared, based on his demeanor.”

(R., p. 639.)

However, the district court did not reject Allen Stacy’s testimony in its entirety.
(Id.) The district court found that, “[a]t the very least, [Allen] Stacy had some
dental work done following his examination by Dr. Coppess and before being
examined by Fairbanks.”

(R., pp. 639-640.)

7

Therefore Fairbanks’ proposed

Related to Fairbanks’ credibility, the district court also found that Fairbanks
gave contradictory testimony during the hearing on a motion for new trial. (R.,
pp. 635-636.)
25

“new” evidence was not material because it did not speak to what Fairbanks did
in 2009, or what Dr. Coppess observed during his examination in 2011.
Third, the district court found that, when considered in the context of the
trial, Fairbanks’ evidence was not material because it would permit the state to
introduce evidence the district court excluded from the trial. (R., pp. 641-643.)
Prior to trial, the district court granted Fairbanks’ motion in limine to bar the state
from introducing evidence related to the scope of Fairbanks’ fraud.

(Id.)

If

Fairbanks were permitted to introduce evidence that Allen Stacy had restorations
on his teeth in 2015, the state would have been permitted to introduce testimony
of Dr. Sept. (Id.) Dr. Sept performed free dental work on Fairbanks’ former
patients because Fairbanks would bill Medicaid for work that was not done, then
when the patients actually needed the work done, Medicaid would not pay again
because Fairbanks had already billed for that procedure. (Id.; see also 1/23/15
Tr., p. 796, L. 13 – p. 806, L. 19;8 R., p. 30.) Further, if Fairbanks’ evidence were
admitted, the state would be able to introduce evidence of Fairbanks’ admission
to overbilling Washington State for same thing he was convicted of in this case.
(R., pp. 641-642.) Fairbanks failed to show his evidence was reasonably likely to
affect the outcome of the trial, and thus failed to show it was material. (Id.)
On appeal, Fairbanks argues evidence that Allen Stacy had restorations
on his teeth when Fairbanks examined him in 2015 “conclusively establish[es]
that Dr. Fairbanks is innocent of Counts I through III.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 20.)

8

Dr. Sept testified outside the presence of the jury as part of an offer of proof.
(1/23/15 Tr., p. 784, Ls. 10-23.)
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This argument is demonstrably incorrect. Fairbanks has failed to show how his
examination and x-rays in 2015 establishes that he did the work in 2009 or that
Dr. Coppess’ examination was incorrect in 2011. This is especially true because
the district court found that Allen Stacy had dental work done in the intervening
years. (See R., pp. 639-640 (“At the very least, [Allen] Stacy had some dental
work done following his examination by Dr. Coppess and before being examined
by Fairbanks.”).) Nor does Fairbanks challenge the district court’s conclusion
that the admission of this additional evidence would not have affected the
outcome of the trial because it would have permitted the state to introduce a
substantial amount of prejudicial evidence. (See R., pp. 641-642.) Nor does
Fairbanks challenge the district court’s finding that this “new” evidence procured
by Fairbanks himself is “questionable” and lacked “any indicia of reliability.” (R.,
pp. 637-638.)

Fairbanks has failed to show the district court abused its

discretion when it determined that Fairbanks’ evidence was not material.
3.

Fairbanks Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its
Discretion When It Found The Evidence Was Not Likely To
Produce An Acquittal

The third prong of the Drapeau standard requires a defendant seeking a
new trial on the grounds of newly discovered evidence to show that the proposed
evidence would have “probably” produced an acquittal if admitted at trial.
Drapeau, 97 Idaho at 691, 551 P.2d at 978.

In this case, the district court

properly utilized its discretion in concluding that Fairbanks failed to make such a
showing. (R., pp. 642-643). Fairbanks argued that his new evidence included
periapical x-rays, which Fairbanks argued were better quality than those utilized
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by Dr. Coppess. (See R., pp. 628, 632, 642-643; 3/5/15 Tr., p. 1394, L. 19 – p.
1396, L. 22.) The district court found that if Fairbanks were allowed to introduce
evidence of these periapical x-rays and argue they are better quality than the xrays procured by Dr. Coppess, then Dr. Coppess would be permitted to explain
why he did not obtain similar periapical x-rays. (R., pp. 642-643.) The district
court found that one of the reasons why Dr. Coppess did not obtain periapical xrays was because of the sheer number of the former Fairbanks patients that Dr.
Coppess examined.

(Id.)

If evidence of Fairbanks’ periapical x-rays were

introduced, then Dr. Coppess would be permitted to explain that he did not get
similar x-rays because of the scope of Fairbanks’ fraud. (Id.) The district court
explained:
In this case, the State, through Dr. Coppess, randomly examined
43 former patients of Fairbanks. In 29 instances, Dr. Coppess
found evidence that Fairbanks had billed Medicaid for work that
had not been performed. One of the reasons Dr. Coppess did not
utilize periapical x-rays was because of the volume of patients
being examined and the time it would take to sterilize the
equipment needed to obtain periapical x-rays. By the time
Fairbanks was charged with Medicaid fraud, the statute of
limitations had run on all but four of the alleged fraudulent billings.
The defendant sought to use the difference between periapical xrays and bite-wing x-rays at trial. However, this Court concluded
that had he done so, he would have opened the door for the State
to explain why it had not obtained periapical x-rays, which would
have allowed the State to show the volume of the alleged fraud.
(R., p. 643 (emphasis in original).)
Prior to trial, Fairbanks had successfully moved to prevent the state from
introducing evidence of the scope of his alleged fraud, including his 2008
admission that he had overbilled Washington State, and his proposed “new”
evidence would have opened the door to his prior bad acts. (Id.)
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On appeal, Fairbanks argues his evidence would likely produce an
acquittal because the new x-rays show restorations on Allen Stacy’s teeth.
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 20-21.) Fairbanks does not address the district court’s
conclusion that this evidence was not likely to produce an acquittal because it
would have opened the door to extensive evidence regarding Fairbanks’ prior
bad acts. Nor does Fairbanks explain how x-rays in 2015 show that Fairbanks
did the work in 2009, or that Dr. Coppess was mistaken in 2011. Nor does
Fairbanks address how these x-rays were likely to produce an acquittal when the
district court found that Allen Stacy had dental work done between 2011 and
2015. (See R., pp. 639-640.) Fairbanks has failed to show the district court
abused its discretion when it determined that 2015 x-rays were unlikely to
produce an acquittal.
4.

Fairbanks Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its
Discretion When It Found That Fairbanks’ Counsel Was Not
Diligent

The fourth prong of the Drapeau standard requires a defendant seeking a
new trial on the grounds of newly discovered evidence to show that his failure to
learn of the evidence prior to trial was not due to his own lack of due diligence.
Drapeau, 97 Idaho at 691, 551 P.2d at 978. The district court properly utilized its
discretion in concluding that Fairbanks failed to satisfy this prong. (R., pp. 644648.)
The district court found that Fairbanks’ counsel was not diligent. (R., pp.
644-648.) One of the arguments raised by Fairbanks’ trial counsel was that he
was diligent because he did not have the authority to compel Allen Stacy to
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participate in an examination. (See R., p. 486.) The district court rejected this
argument and determined if Fairbanks had contacted Allen Stacy prior to trial, it
was likely that, in the event Allen Stacy refused a voluntary pre-trial dental
examination, that the court may have ordered one. (R., pp. 644-648.) Further,
Fairbanks had Allen Stacy’s correct address throughout the entirety of the
proceedings, but failed to do more than make a single phone call. (Id.) The
district court held Fairbanks’ meager efforts did not constitute due diligence:
These meager efforts do not constitute diligence. Fairbanks’s
attorneys had an address for [Allen] Stacy (which was later shown
to be accurate) in the discovery from the State. Moreover, the
address disclosed by the State was in the defendant’s physical
possession during the entirety of these proceedings. Inexplicably
(or tactically), defense counsel never sent a letter to [Allen] Stacy at
the only address they had and at which [Allen] Stacy had lived for
at least eight years preceding the hearing on the motion for new
trial. When serving [Allen] Stacy with a subpoena to attend the
hearing on this motion, a process server was able to locate [Allen]
Stacy within hours of the time he received the task from
Fairbanks’s attorneys. Fairbanks himself was able to locate [Allen]
Stacy and examine his teeth within nine days of the verdict.
(R., p. 647.) The district court concluded that due diligence requires at least
sending a letter to the address and sending someone to visit that address. (R.,
pp. 647-648.)
On appeal, Fairbanks argues that his counsel’s attempt to make a phone
call constituted due diligence and that Fairbanks “lacks the authority to compel a
physical examination of his former patients[.]”

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 19-20.)

Again, Fairbanks does not cite any authority that due diligence is satisfied by
making a phone call to a disconnected number.

Fairbanks also does not

address the district court’s analysis regarding the court’s potential ability to order
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a witness to participate in a physical examination. (See R., pp. 644-646.) Nor
does Fairbanks address his counsel’s failure to even make a pre-trial argument
to the district court for an order for Allen Stacy to participate in an examination. 9
(See id.) Fairbanks has failed to show the district court abused its discretion
when it found that Fairbanks was not diligent in his attempt to contact Allen Stacy
prior to trial.
The district court concluded:
Fairbanks has had his day in court. He received a fair trial. The
jury was presented thorough argument and substantial evidence
from both the State and from Fairbanks, and came to the
unanimous conclusion that Fairbanks was, beyond a reasonable
doubt, guilty of four counts of Provider Fraud. This Court will not
disturb their verdict when Fairbanks has not shown any of the
elements required by the Drapeau test.
(R., p. 648.) Fairbanks has failed to show the district court abused its discretion
regarding any of the four elements of the Drapeau test.

It is very unlikely that, had Fairbanks contacted Allen Stacy prior to trial,
Fairbanks would have needed to get a court order to compel Allen Stacy to
participate in a dental examination. Allen Stacy willingly participated in a posttrial dental examination shortly after he was contacted by Fairbanks. (See R., p.
628.)
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment of the
district court.
DATED this 25th day of May, 2016.
_/s/ Ted S. Tollefson____
TED S. TOLLEFSON
Deputy Attorney General
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